242 Va. 186, 408 S.E.2d 892
Delores LOVE
v.
DURASTILL OF
RICHMOND, INC., et al.
Record No. 901355.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Sept. 20, 1991.
*187 WHITING, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether a particular sales
promotion program is a "pyramid promotional
scheme" as defined in Code 18.2-239(a).
Delores Love paid $5,000 to Durastill of
Richmond, Inc. and Durastill of Virginia,
Inc. (collectively Durastill) in return for certain
contractual rights. First, Love became an
"independent distributor" of water purification stills
sold by Durastill; second, she was entitled to enter
Durastill's training program for distributors; and
third, Love was to receive $1,250 for each new
distributor she recruited to Durastill's program.
Upon paying $5,000 to Durastill, each new
distributor would acquire the same rights as Love.
The first two provisions were in writing, the third
was an oral agreement.
Love entered, but did not complete, Durastill's
training program. On June 1, 1989, Love filed
this action at law to recover her $5,000 payment,
$2,000 in punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees. Love claimed: (1) that the contract
was void because (a) it was procured by fraudulent
misrepresentations, and *188 (b) it was a pyramid
promotional scheme proscribed by Code 18.2- 239;
and (2) that Durastill breached its contract by
failing "to provide her with materially-useful
training."
After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered
judgment for Durastill. The court found that
Durastill's sales promotion program was "a process
whereby part of the money paid by Mrs. Love was
consideration for the opportunity to receive
compensation in return for inducing other persons to
become participants in the program." Nevertheless,
because "there was no possibility of a carry over of
commissions to persons subsequently recruited by
[Love's] recruits," the court concluded that the
contract was not "the type pyramid or promotional
scheme prohibited by" Code **894 18.2-239.
Love appeals only this holding.
The parties agree that the issue on appeal is
whether the trial court's factual finding that Love's
payment for the opportunity to be compensated for
recruiting other program participants is sufficient to
establish a "pyramid promotional scheme" within the
statutory proscription.
First, we consider the pertinent provisions of Code
18.2-239:
Every person who contrives, prepares, sets up,
operates, advertises or promotes any pyramid
promotional scheme shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor. For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Pyramid promotional scheme" means any
program utilizing a pyramid or chain process by
which a participant gives a valuable consideration
for the opportunity to receive compensation ... in
return for inducing other persons to become
participants in the program.
[1][2] Durastill contends that a necessary element
of a pyramid promotional scheme is a multi-layered
vertical integration between a distributor, the
distributor's recruits, and the recruits of such recruits
whereby each person in the pyramid receives
compensation from the efforts of those in the
pyramid beneath her or him. Thus, according to
Durastill, because its program limits Love's
commissions to those from her direct sales of
Durastill distributorships and products, its program
cannot be a pyramid promotional scheme within the
purview of Code 18.2-239.
A "pyramid sales scheme" is defined as "[a] device,
illegal in many states, in which a buyer of goods is
promised a payment *189 for each additional buyer
procured by him." Black's Law Dictionary
1237 (6th ed.1990). Neither that dictionary
definition nor the statutory definition of Code
18.2- 239(a) indicates that there must be a multi-layered vertical chain of compensation flowing to
intermediate participants from the efforts of their
recruits.
Nevertheless, Durastill implies that we have
already adopted its construction of Code 18.2-239(a) in Bell v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 298,
374 S.E.2d 13 (1988), and Thaxton v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 38, 175 S.E.2d 264
(1970). We do not agree.
Although in both cases there were contractual
provisions for the multi-layered vertical integration
that Durastill claims to be an essential part of a
statutory violation, neither case turned upon the
definition of a "pyramid promotional scheme." In
Bell, the issue was whether the participants gave
the statutorily required "valuable consideration." 236
Va. at 302, 374 S.E.2d at 16. In Thaxton, the
decision turned upon whether the participants were
agents of the out-of-state promoter, thus requiring the
promoter to domesticate in Virginia. 211 Va. at
39, 175 S.E.2d at 265.
Although we agree with Durastill that this penal
statute must be construed strictly, "that rule of
construction 'does not abrogate the well recognized
canon that a statute or ordinance should be read and
applied so as to accord with the purpose intended and
attain the objects desired if that may be accomplished
without doing harm to its language.' " Crone v.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 238 Va. 248,
254, 384 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1989) (quoting Gough v.
Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 575, 90 S.E.2d 171, 174
(1955)).
Bell makes plain one of the legislative purposes in
enacting Code 18.2- 239. In describing the effect
of the promotional scheme, we said
[a]s the number in the chain of participants
expands and the market for new recruits declines,
the law of diminishing returns begins to operate
against the interests of those who become
participants late in the process. Once the market is
exhausted, no participant ... has an "opportunity to
receive compensation ... in return for inducing other
persons to become participants in the program."
Code 18.2-239(a); Bell, 236 Va. at 303, 374
S.E.2d at 16.
The Bell rationale applies here. Durastill's
program is designed to create an expanding **895
chain of participants, each of *190 whom pays
Durastill $5,000 for the privilege of earning
commissions by recruiting other participants. In
order to recoup their $5,000 investments and to make
additional profits, the distributors and their
expanding chain of recruits are encouraged to sell as
many distributorships as they can. As the base of
the pyramid expands, there are fewer persons left to
be potential distributors. Thus, the law of
diminishing returns begins to operate against later
recruits, eventually depriving them of their purchased
"opportunity to receive compensation ... in return for
inducing other persons to become participants in the
program." Code 18.2-239(a). Clearly, this is an
evil that Code 18.2- 239(a) sought to suppress.
Nor is harm done to the language of the statutory
definition by concluding that the intermediate parties
need not receive compensation from the efforts of
their recruits to establish a pyramid promotional
scheme. Durastill's scheme is within the language
of the statutory definition of a pyramid promotional
scheme because it "utiliz[es] a pyramid or chain
process" that places Durastill at the apex of a
pyramid resting upon a base of distributors who have
been enticed into paying Durastill $5,000 for the
ever- decreasing opportunity to recoup their
investment by recruiting other distributors.
For these reasons, we conclude that Durastill's
promotional sales program is a "pyramid
promotional scheme" that violates the provisions of
Code 18.2- 239. Therefore, Durastill's contract
with Love is "against public policy," and made
"void and unenforceable" by the provisions of Code
18.2-239. Accordingly, we will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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